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Abstract
Privacy is a big hurdle for collaborative data mining
across multiple parties. We present multi-party compu-
tation (MPC) framework designed for large-scale data
mining tasks. PrivPy combines an easy-to-use and highly
flexible Python programming interface with state-of-the-
art secret-sharing-based MPC backend. With essen-
tial data types and operations (such as NumPy arrays
and broadcasting), as well as automatic code-rewriting,
programmers can write modern data mining algorithms
conveniently in familiar Python. We demonstrate that
we can support many real-world machine learning algo-
rithms (e.g. logistic regression and convolutional neural
networks) and large datasets (e.g. 5000-by-1-million ma-
trix) with minimal algorithm porting effort.
1 Introduction
Privacy is an important issue in big data age. The suc-
cess of data mining is often built on data, and it is often
desirable to integrate data from multiple sources for bet-
ter mining results. However, the unrestricted exchanging
of sensitive data may threaten users’ privacy and is often
prohibited by laws or business practices. How to protect
privacy while allowing the integration of multiple data
sources demands prompt solutions.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows play-
ers to collectively compute a function without revealing
private information except for the final output. MPC of-
ten uses various cryptographic primitives, such as gar-
bled circuit [49] and secret sharing [43], with different
efficiency and security assumptions. After more than 30
years of development, we have started to see that the real-
world data mining applications start to use MPC [29, 48].
However, numerous challenges still exist that prevent
widespread adoption of secure computation techniques.
One of the most important issue hindering MPC’s
adoption is programmability, especially for “big data”
applications. Despite of the development of efficiency
improvement of MPC during the past decades, exist-
ing MPC solutions often ignore the core requirements of
data mining applications. They either require consider-
able expertise in cryptography to understand the cost of
each operation, or use special programming languages
with high learning curves [42, 19, 13, 35, 6, 30]. Some
useful solutions, such as [46], though providing rich in-
terfaces for MPC, mainly focus on basic MPC opera-
tions, including not only basic arithmetics but also low-
level cryptography tools such as oblivious transfer [41].
In contrast, machine learning programmers use Python-
based frameworks like PyTorch [37], Tensorflow [1] and
Scikit-learn [38] with built-in support of high-level data
types like real numbers, vectors and matrices, as well
as non-linear functions such as the logistic function and
ReLu. It is almost impossible for data scientists to
rebuild and optimize all these often taken-for-granted
primitives in a modern machine learning package in an
MPC language. On the other hand, it is also costly for
MPC experts to rewrite all the machine learning algo-
rithm packages. Thus, it is essential to design an MPC
front-end that is friendly with the data mining commu-
nity, which is Python with NumPy [45] nowadays. Ac-
tually, many machine learning frameworks use Python
front-ends and provide Numpy-style array operations to
ease machine learning programming.
In this paper, we propose PrivPy, an efficient frame-
work for privacy-preserving collaborative data mining,
aiming to provide an elegant end-to-end solution for data
mining programming. The PrivPy front-end provides
Python interfaces that resemble those from NumPy, one
of the most popular Python packages, as well as a wide
range of functions commonly used in machine learning.
We also provide an computation engine which is based
on secret sharing and provides efficient arithmetics. We
would like to stress that the main goal of PrivPy is not
to make theoretic breakthrough in cryptographic proto-
cols, but rather to build a practical system that enables
elegant machine learning programming on secure com-
putation frameworks and makes right trade-offs between
efficiency and security. In particular, we make the fol-
lowing contributions:
1. Python programming interface with high-level
data types. We provide a very clean Python
language integration with privacy-enabled com-
mon operations and high-level primitives, including
broadcasting that manipulates arrays of different
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shapes, and the ndarray methods, two Numpy [45]
features widely utilized to implement machine
learning algorithms, with which developers can port
complex machine learning algorithms onto PrivPy
with minimal effort.
2. Automatic code check and optimization. Our
front-end will help the programmers avoid “perfor-
mance pitfalls”, by checking the code and optimiz-
ing it automatically.
3. Decoupling programming front-end with com-
putation back-ends. We introduce a general pri-
vate operator layer to allow the same interface to
support multiple computation back-ends, allowing
trade-offs among different performance and secu-
rity assumptions. Our current implementation sup-
ports the SPDZ back-end, the ABY3 back-end and
our own computation engine.
4. Validation on large-scale machine learning tasks.
We demonstrate the practicality of our system for
data mining applications, such as data query, lo-
gistic regression and convolutional neural network
(CNN), on real-world datasets and application sce-
narios. We also show that our system can scale
to large-scale tasks by transparently manipulating a
5000-by-1-million matrix.
2 Related Work
In this paper, we mainly focus on privacy-preserving
computation systems for general arithmetics, especially
for data mining tasks. A practical such system includes
two parts: an efficient computation engine and an easy-
to-use programming front-end.
Frameworks based on (fully) homomorphic encryp-
tion [32, 17] are impractical due to heavy computation
overhead. Approaches based on garbled circuit (GC) [4,
46, 51, 34] will be impractical for general-purpose arith-
metical computations, especially for various kinds of ma-
chine learning algorithms, as they are costly in band-
width. There are also many MPC frameworks using se-
cret sharing supporting general arithmetics. For exam-
ple, [3] performs integer/bit multiplication with 1 round
and optimal communication cost using three semi-honest
servers. SPDZ [13] uses addition secret sharing and can
tolerate up to n−1 corrupted parties. While natively sup-
porting efficient integer operations, most of them (e.g.
[7, 13]) support real numbers by parsing each shared in-
teger into m field elements (m is the bit length of the each
field element) and use bit-level operations to simulate
fixed/floating point operations [10, 26, 23], thus requires
each party to send O(m) meessages. SecureML [35] is
based on two-party secret sharing and provides built-in
fixed-point multiplication with O(1) message complex-
ity, but requires expensive precomputation to generate
Beaver multiplication triples. ObliviousNN [31] opti-
mizes the performance of dot product, but suffers sim-
ilar problem with SecureML. ABY3 [33], which extends
the work of [3] and provides three-party computation,
is the state-of-the-art for general arithmetics. To per-
form fixed-point multiplication, ABY3 provides two al-
ternatives: one requires a lightweight precomputation
and each party needs to send no more than 2 messages
in 1 round in the online phase, while the other requires
no precomputation and each party sends no more than
2 messages, but needs 2 rounds. In comparison, our
computation engine, which also provides built-in support
for fixed-points, performs fixed-point multiplication in 1
round without precomputation and each party only sends
2 messages.
We emphasize that the adoption of privacy-preserving
computation is beyond the computation efficiency
and the programmability is as the same importance.
TASTY [19] and ABY [15] provide interfaces for pro-
grammers to convert between different schemes. How-
ever, they only expose low-level interfaces and the pro-
grammers should decide by themselves which crypto-
graphic tools to choose and when to convert them, mak-
ing the learning curve steep. L1 [42] is an intermediate
language for MPC and supports basic operations. But
L1 is a domain-specific language and does not provide
high-level primitives to ease array/matrix operations fre-
quently used in machine learning algorithms. [14] and
[8] suffer from similar problems. PICCO [52] supports
additive secret sharing and provides customized C-like
interfaces. But the interfaces are not intuitive enough
and only support simple operations for array. Also, ac-
cording to their report, the performance is not practical
enough for large-scale arithmetical tasks. KSS [25] and
ObliVM [30] also suffer from these issues. [12] provides
a compiler for SPDZ and [2] extends it to support more
MPC protocols. But they are still domain-specific and
do not provide enough high-level primitives for machine
learning tasks. PrivPy, on the other hand, stays compat-
ible with Python and provides high-level primitives (e.g.
broadcasting) with automatic code check and optimiza-
tion, requiring no learning curve on the application pro-
grammer side, making it possible to implement machine
learning algorithms conveniently in a privacy-preserving
situation.
3 PrivPy Design Overview
3.1 Problem formulation
Application scenarios. We identify the following two
major application scenarios for privacy-preserving data
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mining:
• multi-source data mining. It is common that mul-
tiple organizations (e.g. hospitals), each indepen-
dently collecting part of a dataset (e.g. patients’ in-
formation), want to jointly train a model (e.g. for
inferring a disease), without revealing any informa-
tion.
• inference with secret model and data. Some-
times the parameters of a model are valuable. For
example, the credit scoring parameters are often
kept secret. Neither the model owner nor the data
owner want to leak their data in the computation.
Problem formulation. We formulate both scenarios as
an MPC problem: there are n clients Ci(i = 1,2, . . . ,n).
Each Ci has a set of private data Di as its input. The
goal is to use the union of all Di’s to compute some func-
tion o= f (D1,D2, . . . ,Dn), while no private information
other than the output o is revealed during the computa-
tion. Di can be records collected independently by Ci,
and Ci’s can use them to jointly train a model or perform
data queries.
Security assumptions. Our design is based on two
widely adopted assumptions in the security commu-
nity [7, 3, 29]: 1) All of the servers are semi-honest,
which means all servers follow the protocol and would
not conspire with other servers, but they are curious
about the users’ privacy and would steal information as
much as possible; and 2) all communication channels
are secure and adversaries cannot see/modify anything
in these channels. In practice, as there is a growing num-
ber of independent and competing cloud providers, it is
feasible to find a small number of such servers. We leave
extensions of detecting malicious adversaries as future
work.
3.2 Design overview
Fig. 1 shows an overview of PrivPy design, which
has two main components: the language front-end and
the computation engine back-end. The front-end pro-
vides programming interfaces and code optimizations.
The back-end performs the secret-sharing-based privacy-
preserving computation. We discuss our key design ra-
tionals in this section.
Decoupling the frontend with backend. We decou-
ple the front-end and back-end using an extensible in-
terface. The major benefit is that we can adapt to mul-
tiple language and backend techniques. While we be-
lieve Python is a natural choice for the frontend for the
data mining community, we support multiple MPC back-
ends to allow tradeoffs among different security assump-
tions and performance. Our interface between frontend
Computation Engines
(Privpy engine, SPDZ, …)
Parser Optimizer
Convenient APIs Language
Front-end
Back-end
PrivPy
Figure 1: The overview of PrivPy architecture.
and backend is extensible. The basic interface only re-
quire scaler data types and operations, making it possi-
ble to use very simple engines. Then we add extension
interfaces to fully utilize backends with performance-
optimizations such as array types and complex compu-
tation functions (e.g. vector outer product). It is an anal-
ogous to the extensible instruction set architecture (ISA)
design. In fact, we currently support three backends: our
own backend, SPDZ [13], ABY3 [33].
Focus on performance optimizations for the entire al-
gorithm. Performance is the key to enable scalable data
mining tasks. We optimize performance at three differ-
ent levels: 1) optimize single operation performance us-
ing the 2-out-of-4 secret sharing protocols; 2) batch up
operations whenever possible; 3) perform language-level
optimizations in the language frontend.
Based on 2-out-of-4 secret sharing protocol. Han-
dling collaborative data mining tasks over multiple par-
ties has some two unique performance challenge: 1)
the computation might happen on wide area networks
(WANs), and thus it is both bandwidth and latency sen-
sitive; and 2) there are vast amount of data, and thus
we need to minimize the overall computation, including
the preprocessing. Existing engines either require mul-
tiple rounds of communication and thus perform poorly
in WANs ([7, 13]), or require significant amount of pre-
computation ([35, 33]).
We design a 2-out-of-4 secret sharing protocol com-
bining the ideas in SecureML [35] and ABY3 [33].
By adding a fourth server, we can eliminate the pre-
computation in ABY3, but keep its one-round only on-
line communication feature for fixed-point multiplica-
tion while preserving the same online communication
complexity. Also, the correctness proof of our protocol
directly follows [33] and [35], making it simple to es-
tablish the correctness.
Hierarchical private operations (POs). We call oper-
ations on private variable private operations (POs). Ta-
ble 1 provides an overview of different POs implemented
in PrivPy.
We identified a number of POs that are either essential
for computation or performance critical, and we imple-
ment them directly in secret sharing. We call them basic
POs. Limited by space, we only introduce the fixed-point
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type operations
basic add/sub multiplication
oblivious
transfer
bit
extraction
derived comparison sigmoid relu divisionlog exp sqrt abs
ndarray
all any append argmax
argmin argparition argsort clip
compress copy cumprod cumsum
diag dot fill flatten
item itemset max mean
min ones outer partition
prod ptp put ravel
repeat reshape resize searchsorted
sort squeeze std sum
swapaxes take tile trace
transpose var zeros
Table 1: Supported operations of the PrivPy front-end.
number multiplication PO in Section 4.2. Another set of
POs we implement is to support vector and matrix opera-
tions. It is essential to support the array types in Python.
One good feature of the 2-out-of-4 secret sharing is
that the result of the computation is still secret shares
with exactly the same format. Thus, we can concatenate
different POs together and implement derived POs. Note
that even derived POs performs better than a Python-
library as it is pre-compiled in the engine - much like
the built-in routines in a database system.
Using frontend to provide both flexibility and perfor-
mance. PrivPy frontend not only makes it easy for data
scientists to write in familiar Python, but also it provide
extensive optimizations to support array types, including
arbitrary sized arrays and operations. Also, it automat-
ically performs code rewriting to help programmers to
avoid common performance pit-falls.
Engine architecture. We use four (semi-honest)
servers to implement the 2-out-of-4 secret sharing pro-
tocol above in the PrivPy engine: S1, S2, Sa and Sb. We
adopt a client/server model, just like many existing MPC
systems [3, 29, 16, 7, 30]. Clients send secretly shared
data to the servers, then the servers perform privacy-
preserving computation on these shares (see Fig. 2).
Each of the four servers has two subsystems. The se-
cret sharing storage (SS store) subsystem provides (tem-
porary) storage of shares of private inputs and interme-
diate results. while the private operation (PO) subsys-
tem provides an execution environment for private oper-
ations. The servers read shares from the SS store, exe-
cute a PO, and write the shares of the result back to the
SS store. Thus we can compose multiple POs to form a
larger PO or a complex algorithm.
Task execution. In summary, PrivPy runs a ma-
chine learning tasks in the following four steps: 1)
the Python front-end analyzes and rewrites the program
for algorithm-level performance optimization. 2) Each
client computes the secret shares for her private vari-
𝑥
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Figure 2: The overview of PrivPy computation engine.
ables, and sends the resulting shares to the servers. 3)
All servers runs the Python code in parallel on the private
shares without any client involvement, until it reached
the reveal() point in the code. 4) The servers invoke
reveal(), the clients are notified to find the result
shares, and finally recover the cleartext result.
4 The PrivPy computation engine
In this section, using multiplication as an example, we
introduce our secret sharing protocol design, and then
we describe the private operation (POs) we support. The
thread model (security assumptions) is defined in Sec-
tion 3.1.
4.1 Replicated 2-out-of-4 secret sharing
Secret Sharing. Secret sharing encodes a secret number
into multiple shares and distributes the shares to a group
of participants such that no information about the raw
number is revealed as long as no sufficient is gathered.
The simplest secret sharing is to encode a number x into
two numbers r and x− r where r is a random number.
Thus one can reconstruct x only if he gets both shares.
Replicated 2-out-of-4 secret sharing. We combine the
thought of SecureML [35] and ABY3 [33], and design a
more efficient protocol for fixed-point multiplication.
We define a 2-out-of-4 secret sharing, denoted as
(4
2
)
-
sharing, to enable efficient arithmetics. And we consider
all the shares are in a Z2n ring. Concretely, to share
an integer x mod 2n, we encode it as a tuple of shares:
[[x]] = (x1,x′1,x2,x
′
2,xa,x
′
a,xb,x
′
b). S1 holds (x1,x
′
1) where
x1 and x′1 are two independent random integers; S2 holds
(x2,x′2) where x2 = x− x1 and x′2 = x− x′1; Sa holds
(xa,x′a) where xa = x2 and x′a = x′1; Sb holds (xb,x
′
b)
where xb = x1 and x′b = x
′
2. It can be easily seen that
the two numbers each server holds are independently
uniformlly distributed in the ring Z2n , thus the non-
colluding servers learns nothing about x. Note that all
the linear arithmetic operations of the secret shares, such
as +,−,×, are over the ring Z2n . The division operation
x/2d stands for shifting the bits of x right in the two’s-
complement representation.
4
Sharing initialization. To share a number x, a client
encodes it to x1 and x2 where x1 is randomly sampled
in Z2n and x2 = x− x1. Then it sends x1 and x2 to S1
and S2 respectively. After receiving the shares, S1 sends
x1 to Sb, and S2 sends x2 to Sa. Thus the four servers
holds x1,x2,xa,xb respectively. Meanwhile, S1 and S2
generate a random number r using the same seed, and
calculate x′1 = x1−r and x′2 = x2+r respectively. Finally,
S1 sends x′1 to Sa while S2 sends x
′
2 to Sb, and the servers
get the
(4
2
)
-sharing of x. In this situation, each server only
sees two independent random integers that are uniformly
distributed in Z2n , and no information about x is revealed
to each server.
Free addition. It can be easily seen that the
(4
2
)
-sharing
over Z2n is additively homomorphic, i.e., [[x]] + [[y]] =
[[x+ y]], and the result shares still satisfy the above con-
straints. Thus each server can locally compute the share
of the sum. Similarly, for shared bits over Z2, the XOR
operation is also free.
Supporting decimals. We map a decimal x to Z2n as
a fixed-point number: we scale it by a factor of 2d and
represent the rounded integer x˜= b2dxc as a n-bit integer
using the two’s-complement reprensentation. This map-
ping scheme is commonly used (see [35, 33, 10, 9], and
the precision is 2−d . It is obvious that, while ignoring the
precision loss, [[x˜]] remains additively homomorphic.
4.2 Fixed-point multiplication.
To support efficient fixed-point multiplication, we com-
bine the thought of SecureML [35] and ABY3 [33]
which are also secret-sharing based approaches. But
compared with SecureML and ABY3, our fixed-point
multiplication does not require precomputation and only
needs 1 round of communication, and preserves the
same online communication complexity for each server
when ultilizing fully-duplex communication, as Proto-
col 1 shows. A remarkable thing is that, each pair of
servers share a random string and use the string as the
seed of a pseudorandom function, like [3, 33, 34] do, thus
they can get a same random number without communi-
cation. The thought of this protocol is from [35, 33, 3]
and the security is similar with them. Thus we omit the
proof detail here due to space limitation. To argue the
correctness, we observe that
2dz1+2dz2
= (x1y′1− r12+ xby′b+ rab)+(x2y′2+ r12+ xay′a− rab)
= x1y′1+ xby
′
b+ x2y
′
2+ x2y
′
a
= x1y′1+ x1y
′
2+ x2y
′
2+ x2y
′
1
= (x1+ x2)(y′1+ y
′
2) = xy
This means that (2dz1,2dz2), namely (t1+ tb, t2+ ta), is a
two-party share of xy. Thus, according to the theorem in
PROTOCOL 1: Fixed-point multiplication protocol.
Input: Shares of two fixed-point values [[x]] and [[y]]
Output: [[z]] where z= xy/2d
Steps:
a) S1 generates r12 and r′12 and
calculates t1 = x1y′1− r12 and t ′1 = x′1y1− r′12.
Then it sends t1 to Sb and sends t ′1 to Sa.
b) S2 generates r12 and r′12 and
calculates t2 = x2y′2 + r12 and t
′
2 = x
′
2y2 + r
′
12.
Then it sends t2 to Sa and sends t ′2 to Sb.
c) Sa generates rab and r′ab and
calculates ta = xay′a− rab and t ′a = x′aya− r′ab.
Then it sends ta to S2 and sends t ′a to S1.
d) Sb generates r12 and r′12 and
calculates tb = xby′b+ rab and t
′
b = x
′
byb+ r
′
ab.
Then it sends tb to S1 and sends t ′b to S2.
e) S1 sets z1 = (t1 + tb)/2d and z′1 = (t
′
1 + t
′
a)/2
d ;
S2 sets z2 = (t2 + ta)/2d and z′2 = (t
′
2 + t
′
b)/2
d ;
Sa sets za = (ta+ t2)/2d and z′a = (t ′a+ t ′1)/2
d ;
Sb sets zb = (tb+ t1)/2d and z′b = (t
′
b+ t
′
2)/2
d .
[35], (z1,z2) is a two-party share of xy/2d i.e. z1 + z2 =
xy/2d with extremely high probability. The same applies
to z′1 and z
′
2, i.e. z
′
1 + z
′
2 = xy/2
d . Also, we can see that
z1 = zb, z2 = za, z′1 = z
′
a and z
′
2 = z
′
b. This means that the
result shares of z still satisfy the constraint of
(4
2
)
-sharing.
4.3 Bit extraction
Although machine learning tasks seldomly employ bit-
wise operations directly, some non-linear operations
such as comparison can be evaluated efficiently by im-
plementing them using bit extraction: to compare two
shared numbers [[x]] and [[y]] in the ring Z2n , we first cal-
cuate [[z]] = [[x]]− [[y]] and then extract the bit share [[c]]B
where c is the most significant bit of z. As we use two’s-
complement reprensentation, c = 1 means z is negative
(i.e. x < y). Garbled circuit [49], though is efficient for
boolean circuits (e.g. comparison) and requires constant
rounds, usually causes high communication cost, espe-
cially when the data size is large and the throughput is
the main concern, which is the case of machine learning
tasks.
A direct way of bit extraction is to first convert each
share (i.e. x1,x′1,x2, . . . ) of x to bit representation and
then perform addition circuits to get the bit representa-
tion of x, like [33] does. However, with
(4
2
)
sharing, each
server should send or receive at least 1 message to con-
vert each share to the bit representation.
To optimize the bit extraction, we observe that it is
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not necessary to evaluate the whole addition circuit, as
we only need to get the final bit and there is no need to
output some intermediate results. Protocol 2 shows this.
x[i] means the i-th bit of x, while x[1 : k] means the first
k bits of x. To extract the k-th bit of x, we regard x1 and
x2 as two bit arrays, each of which consists of n bits, and
perform an addition circuit on them, then we use the 1-
bit adder in [24] to calculate the carry bits: c[i+ 1] =
(x1[i]⊕ c[i])∧ (x2[i]⊕ c[i])⊕ c[i]. To see how Protocol 2
gets c[i+ 1], we first see from step a-c that u2 ⊕ ua =
x1[1 : k]∧ x2[1 : k]. Then in step h, we get
c[i+1]′1⊕ c[i+1]′2
= ((x1[i]∧ c[i]′1⊕b12)⊕ (xa[i]∧ c[i]′a⊕ua[i]⊕bab))⊕
((x2[i]∧ c[i]′2⊕u2[i]⊕b12)⊕ (xb[i]∧ c[i]′b⊕bab))
= (x1[i]∧ c[i]′)⊕ (x2[i]∧ c[i]′)⊕ (x1[i]∧ x2[i])
= (x1[i]⊕ c[i])∧ (x2[i]⊕ c[i])⊕ c[i] = c[i+1]
Note that in step d-h, we only use c′1,c
′
2,c
′
a and c
′
b. Thus
we can get each carry bit without calculating c1,c2,ca
and cb. Finally, step i-m calculate the output bit as c[k] =
c[k−1]⊕ x1[k−1]⊕ x2[k−1] and reconstruct the shares
to
(4
2
)
-sharing.
The security of this protocol is similar with Protocol 1,
as each server only receives independent random bits at
each step. Thus if we perform the addition circuit by
chaining the 1-bit adders together, each server sends no
more than 2k bits in total, which is the same as the bit
extraction protocol in [33]. We can further optimize the
communiication complexity by letting S1 and Sb share a
half of the shares of x1[1 : k]∧ x2[1 : k] in step a-c. Thus
each server only needs to send 1.5k bits in total. Another
optimization we can use is to employ a parallel prefix
adder (PPA) [?] which uses a divide and conquer strategy
and reduces the total number of rounds to O(logk), like
[33] does.
4.4 OT protocol
Oblivious transfer (OT) [41] enables oblivious selection
between two numbers without revealing the index and
the private numbers: given a shared bit [[c]]B and two
shared numbers [[x]] and [[y]], OT outputs [[x]] if c = 1,
and outputs [[y]] otherwise. Note that this statement is
equivalent to another one: given a shared bit [[c]]B and a
shared number [[δ ]], OT outputs [[x]] if c= 1, and outputs
[[0]] otherwise. This is because we can define δ = y− x
in the first statement and add the OT output to [[x]].
With efficient OT protocols, many common machine
learning components, such as ReLu and piecewise func-
tions, can be evaluated efficiently. Although the goal is
to output cx, we cannot perform OT using Protocol 1 di-
rectly, as the bit share is over Z2 while the integer share
PROTOCOL 2: Bit extraction protocol.
Input: [[x]] and k
Output: [[c]] where c is k-th bit of x
Steps: Each server initilizes c as 0. Then run as follows:
a) S1 generates r12 in Z2k , and calcuates
u1 = x1[1 : k]⊕ r12. Then it sends u1 to Sa.
b) S2 generates r12 in Z2k and sets u2 = x2[1 : k]∧ r12.
c) Sa sets ua = u1∧ xa.
For (i= 1; i<= k−1; i= i+1){
a),resume S1 generates a random bit b12 and calculates
t ′1 = x1[i]∧ c′1⊕b12. Then it sends t ′1 to Sa.
b),resume S2 generates a random bit b12 and calculates
t ′2 = x2[i]∧ c′2⊕u2[i]⊕b12. Then it sends t ′2 to Sb.
c),resume Sa generates a random bit bab and calculates
t ′a = xa[i]∧ c′a⊕ua[i]⊕bab. Then it sends t ′a to S1.
d),resume Sb generates a random bit bab and calculates
t ′b = xb[i]∧ c′b⊕bab. Then it sends t ′b to S2.
e),resume S1 sets c′1 = t
′
1⊕ t ′a; S2 sets c′2 = t ′2⊕ t ′b; Sa sets
c′a = t ′a⊕ t ′1; Sb sets c′b = t ′b⊕ t ′2.
}
a),resume S1 generates a random bit b12 and calculates
c′1 = x1[k]⊕ c′1⊕b12. Then it sends c′1 to Sa.
b),resume Sb generates a random bit b12 and calculates
c′2 = x2[k]⊕ c′2⊕b12. Then it sends c′2 to Sb.
c),resume Sa generates a random bit bab and calculates
ca = xa[k]⊕ c′a⊕bab. Then it sends ca to S2.
d),resume Sb generates a random bit bab and calculates
cb = xb[k]⊕ c′b⊕bab. Then it sends cb to S1.
e),resume S1 sets c1 = cb; S2 sets c2 = ca; Sa sets c′a = c′1;
Sb sets c′b = c
′
2;
is over Z2n . To construct our OT protocol using
(4
2
)
-
sharing, we first convert the XOR opeartion into addition
over Z2n , then perform arithmetical computation on the
shares. Specifically, we have:
cx= (c′1⊕ c′2)(x1+ x2)
= (c′1+ c
′
2−2c′1c′2)(x1+ x2)
= c′1x1+(1−2c′1)c′2x1+ c′2x2+(1−2c′2)c′1x2
= c′1x1+(1−2c′1)c′bxb+ c′2x2+(1−2c′2)c′axa
In the above formulation, c′1x1,c
′
2x2,c
′
axa and c
′
bxb can
be computed locally, thus the servers only need to intro-
duce (1− 2c′1) and (1− 2c′2) into the result. Protocol 3
shows our 4-party OT scheme. The analysis of correct-
ness and security are similar as above. The protocol runs
in 1 round and each server needs to send 4 messages.
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PROTOCOL 3: 4-party OT protocol.
Input: [[x]] over Z2n and [[c]] over Z2
Output: [[y]] where y= x if c= 1, and y= 0 otherwise.
Steps:
a) S1 generates random numbers r12,r1b,r′12 and r
′
1a in Z2n ,
and calculates t1 = c′1x1− r12, t ′1 = c1x′1− r′12,e1 =
(1−2c′1)r12 + r1b,e′1 = (1−2c1)r′12 + r′1a.
Then it sends t ′1 and e1 to Sa, and sends t1 and e
′
1 to Sb.
b) S2 generates random numbers r12,r2a,r′12 and r
′
2b in Z2n ,
and calculates t2 = c′2x2− r12, t ′2 = c2x′2− r′12,e2 =
(1−2c′2)r12 + r2a,e′2 = (1−2c2)r′12 + r′2b.
Then it sends t ′2 and e2 to Sb, and sends t2 and e
′
2 to Sb.
c) Sa generates random numbers rab,r2a,r′ab and r
′
1a in Z2n ,
and calculates ta = c′axa− rab, t ′a = cax′a− r′ab,ea =
(1−2c′a)rab+ r2a,e′a = (1−2ca)r′ab+ r′1a.
Then it sends t ′a and ea to S1, and sends ta and e′a to S2.
d) Sb generates random numbers rab,r1b,r′ab and r
′
2b in Z2n ,
and calculates tb = c′bxb− rab, t ′b = cbx′b− r′ab,eb =
(1−2c′b)rab+ r1b,e′b = (1−2cb)r′ab+ r′2b.
Then it sends t ′b and eb to S2, and sends tb and e
′
b to S1.
e) S1 sets y1 = (1−2c′1)tb+ c′1x1 + ea− r1b and
y′1 = (1−2c1)t ′a+ c1x′1 + e′b− r′1a;
S2 sets y2 = (1−2c′2)ta+ c′2x2 + eb− r2a and
y′2 = (1−2c2)t ′b+ c2x′2 + e′a− r′2b;
Sa sets ya = (1−2c′a)t2 + c′axa+ e1− r2a and
y′a = (1−2ca)t ′1 + cax′a+ e′1− r′1a;
Sb sets yb = (1−2c′b)t1 + c′bxb+ e2− r1b and
y′b = (1−2cb)t ′2 + cbx′b+ e′2− r′2b;
4.5 Other basic POs
Limited by space, we only briefly introduce other POs
here. We implement the comparison operation using
oblivious transfer which enables secure selection be-
tween two private numbers and bit extraction which ex-
tracts a specific bit of a private number, in a similar way
as [33], and thus the correctness and security directly fol-
low [33]. We also implement two basic bitwise opera-
tions XOR and AND, and we can get all kinds of bitwise
operations by composing the two ones. Actually, XOR is
the addition modulo 2, while AND is the multiplication
modulo 2. Thus if we use use
(4
2
)
-sharing to represent a
bit, we can implement XOR and AND similar to addition
and multiplication of integer operations in Z2n .
4.6 Derived POs
We can compose multiple basic POs and form more com-
plex derived POs commonly used in machine learning
algorithms. For example, to compute a ReLu function
f (x) =max(0,x)which is commonly used as a activation
function in neural networks, we can first extract the most
significant bit of−x (which indicates x is positive or not),
then use the OT protocol to get f (x). For division, we can
use the Newton-Raphson algorithm [50] to approximate
the result. Similarly, to implement the logistic function
f (x)= 11+e−x , we can use the Euler method [44]. Another
alternative implementation for the logistic function is the
piecewise function in [35, 33]. We also implement other
common maths functions using similar numerical meth-
ods, such as sqrt, log, exp and max pooling in a similar
way. With these basic POs and derived POs, we can fur-
ther implement complex algorithms as usual.
4.7 POs for performance optimization
We provide the following three sets of POs whose func-
tionality is already covered by the basic POs, but the sep-
arate versions can significantly improve performance in
certain cases. Programmers can use these POs directly.
Batching POs. Batch up is a commonly used optimiza-
tion in MPC frameworks [7, 13, 52], which batches up
independent data transfers among the servers and thus
reduce the fixed overhead. Array POs natively sup-
port batch up. And as many machine learning algo-
rithms heavily utilize array operations, this optimization
reduces communication rounds and can improve perfor-
mance significantly.
Multiply by public variables. In a case where an oper-
ation involves both public and private variables, we can
optimize performance by revealing the public variables.
Multiplication benefits from the optimization the most,
as the servers only need to multiply their shares by the
public variables directly and there is no necessary com-
munication.
Dot and outer product. Dot and outer product of ma-
trices are frequently used in common machine learning
algorithms. For example, logistic regression and neural
networks use dot product for forward propagation, rep-
resented as Y =W ·X + b. Outer product is often used
for calculating gradients. While implementing them us-
ing for-loops, there are too many duplicated transfers
for each element, as each element will be multiplied
by several other elements in a multi-dimensional situa-
tion. We thus provide built-in optimized dot and outer
product. Specifically, for two private matrices [[A]] and
[[B]], we can calculate the dot product as [[A]] · [[B]] =
A1 ·B′1+A2 ·B′2+Aa ·B′a+Ab ·B′b. This optimization sig-
nificantly reduces communication cost. As an example,
given two n×n matrices, a for-loop for dot product trig-
gers n3 multiplications and the communication complex-
ity is O(n3), while the optimized one only incurs com-
munication complexity of O(n2).
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1 x = privpy.ss(clientID)
2 def logistic(x, start , iter_cnt):
3 result = 1.0 / (1 + math.exp(-start))
4 deltaX = (x - start) / iter_cnt
5 for i in range(iter_cnt):
6 derivate = result * (1 - result)
7 result += deltaX * derivate
8 return result
9 result = logistic(x, 0, 100) # main ()
10 result.reveal ()
11
Figure 3: Example PrivPy code: logistic function.
import privpy as pp
x = ... # read data using ss()
factor ,gamma ,lamb ,iter_cnt =
initPublicParameters ()
n,d = x.shape
P = pp.random.random ((n,factor))
Q = pp.random.random ((d,factor))
for _ in range(iter_cnt):
e = x - pp.dot(P,pp.transpose(Q))
P1 = pp.reshape(pp.repeat(P,d,axis =0),P.
shape [:-1] + (d,P.shape [-1]))
e1 = pp.reshape(pp.repeat(e,factor ,axis
=1),e.shape + (factor ,))
Q1 = pp.reshape(pp.tile(Q,(n,1)),(n,d,
factor))
Q += pp.sum(gamma * (e1 * P1 - lamb * Q1
),axis = 0)/n
Q1 = pp.reshape(pp.tile(Q,(n,1)),(n,d,
factor))
P += pp.sum(gamma * (e1 * Q1 - lamb * P1
),axis = 1)/d
P.reveal (); Q.reveal ()
Figure 4: Example PrivPy code: matrix factorization.
5 Front-end and Optimizations
We now introduce the design and implementation of the
programming interfaces. Our goal is to provide intuitive
interfaces and automatic optimizations to avoid steep
learning curves and enable programmers to focus on the
machine learning algorithm itself.
5.1 PrivPy Front-end Features
A PrivPy program is a valid Python program with
NumPy-style data type definitions. We use three real
code segments to illustrate the PrivPy features essential
to implementing data mining algorithms.
Fig. 3 shows a PrivPy program that computes the
logistic function f (x) = 1/(1 + e−x) using the Euler
method [44]. Fig. 4 shows an extra example of matrix
factorization, which decomposes a large private matrix x
to two latent matrices P and Q. Lastly, Fig. 5 shows an
example of neural network inference.
import privpy as pp
x = ... # read data using ss()
W, b = ... # read model using ss()
for i in range(len(W)):
x = pp.dot(W.T, x) + b
x = pp.relu(x)
res = pp.argmax(x, axis =1)
res.reveal ()
Figure 5: Example PrivPy code: neural network infer-
ence.
Basic semantics. Unlike many domain-specific front-
ends [19, 42, 7], which require the programmers to have
knowledge about cryptography and use customized lan-
guages, the program itself (lines 2-9) is a plain Python
program, which can run in a raw Python environment
with cleartext input, and the user only needs to add
two things to make it private-preserving in PrivPy: (i)
Declaring the private variables. Line 1 declares a pri-
vate variable x as the input from the client clientID using
the ss function. (ii) Getting results back. The function
reveal in line 10 allows clients to recover the cleartext
of the private variable. Programmers not familiar with
cryptography, such as machine learning programmers,
can thus implement algorithms with minimal effort.
All operations support both scalar and array types.
PrivPy supports scalars, as well as arrays of any shape.
Supporting array operations is essential for writing
and optimizing machine learning algorithms which rely
heavily on arrays. While invoking the ss method, PrivPy
detects the type and the shape of x automatically. If x is
an array, the program returns an array of the same shape,
containing the function on every element in x. Follow-
ing the NumPy [45] semantics, we also provide broad-
casting that allows operations between a scalar and an
array, as well as between arrays of different shapes, two
widely used idioms. That is why the logistic func-
tion in Fig. 3 works correctly even when x is a private
array. As far as we know, existing MPC front-ends, such
as [7, 42, 52, 13], do not support such elegant program.
For example, PICCO [52] only supports operations for
arrays of equal shape.
Private array types. Array operations are pretty com-
mon in machine learning algorithms. The private array
class in PrivPy encapsulates arrays of any shape. Users
only need to pass a private array to the constructor, then
the constructor automatically detects the shape. Like
the array type in Numpy [45], our private array supports
broadcasting, i.e. PrivPy can handle arithmetic opera-
tions with arrays of different shapes by “broadcasting”
the smaller arrays (see [21] for details). For example,
given a scalar x, a 4×3 array A, a 2×4×3 array B and
a 2× 1× 3 array C, the expressions x⊙A, A⊙B and
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B
⊙
C are all legal in PrivPy, where
⊙
can be +,×and>
etc. Note that in PrivPy, the above variables can be ei-
ther public or private. With broadcasting, programmers
can write elegant machine learning algorithms regardless
of the shapes of the inputs and model parameters.
We also implement most of the ndarray methods of
Numpy, with which application programmers can ma-
nipulate arrays conveniently and efficiently, except for
the methods related with IO (we leave IO as the future
work). Table 1 lists the ndarray methods we have imple-
mented (see [22] for details of numpy.ndarray).
Broadcasting and ndarray methods are essential for
implementing common machine learning algorithms
which usually handle arrays of different shapes.
Both Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 demonstrate ndarray methods
in PrivPy. Users can implement the algorithms in plain
Python, then just replace the Numpy package with PrivPy
package and add private variables declaration. Actually,
by replacing all privpy with numpy, the main parts of
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 can run directly in raw Python environ-
ment with cleartext inputs.
Support for large arrays. Mapping the data onto se-
cret shares unavoidably increases the data size. Thus,
real-world datasets that fit in memory in cleartext may
fail to load in the private version. For example, the
1,000,000×5,048 matrix require over 150GB memory.
Automatic code rewriting. With the program written
by users, the interpreter of our front-end parses it to ba-
sic privacy-preserving operations supported by the back-
end, and the optimizer automatically rewrites the pro-
gram to improve efficiency (see Section 5 for details).
This optimization can help programmers avoid perfor-
mance “pit falls” in MPC situation.
5.2 Implementations
Based on Plain Python Interpreter. We write our
backend in C++ for performance, and we implement our
frontend in Python to keep python compatibility. The
backend is linked to the frontend as a library on each
server to reduce the overhead between the frontend and
backend. During a execution task, the same Python code
is interpretered on each server and client in parallel.
NumPy-style data type definitions and operator over-
loading. We define our own data types SNum and SArr,
to represent the secret numbers and arrays, respectively.
Then we overload operators for private data classes, so
standard operators such as +,−,∗,>,= work on both
private and public data. The implementation of these
overloaded operators chooses the right POs to use based
on data types and the sizes at runtime.
Automatic disk-backed large arrays. We provide a
LargeArray class that transparently uses disks as the
back storage for arrays too large to fit in memory.
5.3 Code analysis and optimization
Comparing to the computation on cleartext, private op-
erations have very distinct cost, and many familiar pro-
gramming constructs may lead to bad performance, cre-
ating “performance pitfalls”. Thus, we provide aggres-
sive code analysis and rewriting to help avoid these pit-
falls. For example, it is fine to write an element-wise
multiplication of two vectors in plain Python program.
for i in range(n): z[i] = x[i] * y[i]
However, this is a typical anti-pattern causing perfor-
mance overhead due to the n multiplications involved,
comparing to a single array operation (Section 4.7). To
solve the problem, we build a source code analyzer and
optimizer based on Python’s abstract syntax tree (AST)
package [36]. Before the servers execute the user code,
our analyzer scans the AST and rewrites anti-patterns
into more efficient ones. In this paper, we implement
three examples:
For-loops vectorization. Vectorization [47] is a well-
known complier optimization. This analyzer rewrites the
above for-loop into a vector form~z =~x∗~y. The rewriter
also generates code to initialize the vector variables.
Common factor extraction. We convert expressions
with pattern x ∗ y1 + x ∗ y2 + · · ·+ x ∗ yn to x ∗ (y1 + y2 +
· · ·+yn). In this way, we reduce the number of × from n
to 1, saving significant communication time.
Common expression vectorization. Programmers
often write vector expressions explicitly, like x1 ∗ y1 +
x2 ∗ y2 + · · ·+ xn ∗ yn, especially for short vectors. The
optimizer extracts two vectors ~x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and
~y= (y1,y2, . . . ,yn), and rewrite the expression into a vec-
tor dot product of~x ·~y. Note that x1,x2, . . . ,xn do not have
to be the same shape, as PrivPy supports batch operations
with mixed shapes.
Reject for unsupported statements. We allow users
to write legal Python code that we cannot run correctly,
such as branches with private conditions (actually, most
MPC tools do not support private conditions [52, 30],
or only support limited scenarios [52, 51]). In order to
minimize users’ surprises at runtime, we perform AST-
level static checking, then reject unsupported statements
at the initialization phase and terminate with an error.
6 Evaluation
Testbed. We run our experiments on four Amazon EC2
virtual machines. All machines are of type c5.2xlarge
with 8 Intel Xeon Platinum 8000-series CPU cores and
64 GB RAM. Each machine has a 1 GB Ethernet adapter
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fixed-point multiplication comparison
10,473,532 128,2027
Table 2: Throughput (ops/second) of fundamental oper-
ations over Z2128 in the LAN setting.
running in full-duplex mode. In our experiments, we
consider two network settings: a LAN setting where
each virtual machine has 10Gbps incoming and outgo-
ing bandwidth, and a WAN setting where the bandwidth
of each virtual machine is 50 Mbps and the RTT latency
is 100 ms.
Parameter setting. All arithmetic shares are over Z2128 ,
and we set d = 40, which means the scaling factor is
240. We repeat each experiment 10 times and report the
average values.
PrivPy implementation. We implement the front-end
of PrivPy with Python, and use C++ to implement our
computation engine. And we use the built-in int128
type of gcc to implement 128-bit integers. We compile
the C++ code using g++ -O3, and wrap it into Python
code using the Boost.Python library [?]. We use SSL
with 1024-bit keys to protect all communications.
6.1 Microbenchmarks
We first perform microbenchmarks in the LAN setting to
show the performance of basic operations and the bene-
fits of optimizations.
Basic operations. PrivPy engine supports efficient
fundamental operations, including addition, fixed-point
multiplication and comparison. Addition can be done lo-
cally, while multiplication and comparison involve com-
munication. Thus we demonstrate the performance of
the latter two, as Table 2 shows.
Client-server interaction. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of the secret sharing process ss, with which the
clients split raw data to secret shares and send them to
the servers, and the reverse process reveal, with which
the clients receive the shares from the servers and re-
cover them to the plaintexts. We evaluate the time (in-
cluding computation and communication) with different
numbers of clients and dimensions, assuming that each
client holds an accordingly dimensional vector. Figure 6
shows that even with 1000 clients and 1000-dimension
vectors, it takes only less 0.3 seconds for the servers to
collect/reveal all the data from/to all the clients.
Effects of batch operations. We evaluate the effec-
tiveness of batching up, using two common operations:
element-wise multiplication and dot product on vectors.
For multiplication, we batch up the communication of
independent operations, while for dot product of two m-
dimensional vectors, we only need to transfer the dot-
producted shares and the communication cost is reduced
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Figure 6: Performance of ss and reveal.
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Figure 7: The optimization of doing operations in batch.
from O(m) to O(1). We vary the number of elements
and measure the time consumption, and Fig. 7 shows the
result (the y-axis is the logarithm of time). Both cases
show benefits over 1000×.
Effects of code optimizations. We evaluate the com-
mon factor extraction and expression vectorization. As
these hand-written anti-patterns are usually small, we
range the expression size from 2 to 10. Figure 8 shows
that more than 4× performance improvement for five-
term expressions in both situations.
Disk-backed large array performance. The PrivPy
front-end provides a class LargeArray to automatically
handle the large arrays that are too large to fit in the
memory. As LaregeClass uses disks as back storage,
we should consider the effect of the disk IO time to the
overall performance. To evaluate the performance of
LargeArray, we use the Movielens dataset [18] which
contains 1 million movie ratings from thousands of users.
We encode the dataset to a 1,000,000× 5048 matrix,
which requires 150GB memory space in each machine.
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Figure 8: Code optimizer performance.
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communication +
computation
disk IO total
single 0.38 0.7 1.08
batched 0.172 0.574 0.746
Table 3: Time (milliseconds) for dot product of a large
array.
batch size LR MF
single 0.027 0.037
batched 0.026 0.042
Table 4: Time (seconds) for real algorithms with large
arrays.
We then perform a dot product of a batch of elements in
the dataset and a 5048-dimensional vector. We evaluate
the performance by varying the batch size and randomly
choosing a batch of items in the dataset. As Table 3
shows, the disk IO becomes the main cost. The reason
is that the program should sequentially scan the large ar-
ray stored in the disk to retrieve the randomly choosen
batch.
We then apply LargeArray to the training of real al-
gorithms: logistic regression (LR) which is trained using
SGD, and matrix factorization (MF) [5] which decom-
poses a large matrix into two smaller latent matrices for
efficient prediction (in this paper, we decompose each
m× n matrix to a m× 5 matrix and a 5× n matrix). Ta-
ble 4 shows the result.
6.2 Performance of real algorithms
The focus of PrivPy is the algorithm performance on
real big datasets. We present our experience in com-
mon algorithms, including logisgtic regression (LR), ma-
trix factorization (MF) and neural network (NN), using
both ABY3 and our backend. ABY3 engine has sev-
eral configuration options, we use the most performance-
optimized options of ABY3 (semi-honest assumption
without precomputation) in all the evaluations.
We perform our evaluation in both the LAN setting
and the WAN setting, and use the MNIST dataset [27]
which includes 70,000 labeled handwritten digits [11]
with 28× 28 pixels each. We evaluate the performance
for both training and inference. And as our front-end
supports both engines, we run the same algorithm codes
written with Python on the two engines.
Table 5 shows the average time consumed by 1 itera-
tion of training. The logistic regression and matrix fac-
torization is constructed as above, and the neural network
(NN) has a 784-dimensonal input layer, two 128- hidden
layers and a 10-dimensional output layer.
For inference, we in addition evaulate the LeNet-
5 [28] model to demonstrate convonlutional neural net-
work (CNN). LeNet-5 has a 784-dimension input layer, 3
convolutional layers with a 5× 5 kernel, 2 sum-pooling
batch
size
engine
LAN WAN
LR MF NN LR MF NN
single
ABY3 5.2e-3 7.4e-3 1.8e-2 2.16 0.62 1.27
PrivPy 5.3e-3 7.1e-3 1.7e-2 2.61 0.37 1.16
batched
ABY3 3.94 5.72 58.1 7.53 18.6 637
PrivPy 3.92 5.67 52.5 7.3 13.2 554
Table 5: Time (seconds) for training of real algorithms
with different engines.
batch
size
engine
LAN WAN
NN CNN
CNN
+BN
NN CNN
CNN
+BN
single
ABY3 1.3e-2 9.6e-2 0.16 2.43 6.83 8.07
PrivPy 1.3e-2 9.6e-2 0.17 2.49 7.64 8.07
batched
ABY3 1.45 12.6 13.2 8.12 58.9 59.5
PrivPy 1.38 12.02 12.2 7.22 56.3 57.9
Table 6: Time (seconds) for inference of real algorithms
with different engines.
layers, 3 sigmoid layers, 1 dot product layer, 1 Radial
Basis Function layer, and an argmin function on a 10-
dimension vector to get the output. Then based on the
LeNet-5 model, we add a batch normalization [20] layer
to each sigmoid layer to get a CNN+BN model. The
evaluation result is as Table 6 shows.
From the evaluation results, we can see that our com-
putation engine performs better than ABY3 for both
training and inference, especially in the WAN setting.
This is because, although both ABY3 and our computa-
tion engine require no precomputation and have the same
communication cost for each server, ABY3 requires 1
more round than our computation engine for fixed-point
multiplication, thus causes lower performance.
Finally, we stress the usability of our front-end. Ta-
ble 7 shows the lines of codes for each algorithm and the
time for a student who focuses on data mining but is un-
familiar with cryptography to write each algorithm using
our front-end.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Over thirty years of MPC literature provides an ocean of
protocols and systems great on certain aspects of perfor-
mance, security or ease of programming. We believe it
is time to integrate these techniques into an application-
driven and coherent system for machine learning tasks.
PrivPy is a framework with top-down design. At the
LR MF NN CNN CNN+BN
lines 42 25 9 83 87
time 0.7 0.5 0.1 1.5 1.5
Table 7: Lines of codes and time (hours) for implement-
ing real algorithms.
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top, it provides familiar Python-compatible interfaces
with essential data types like real numbers and arrays,
and use code optimizer/checkers to avoid common mis-
takes. In the middle, using an intermediary for storage
and communication, we build a composable PO system
that helps decoupling the front-end with backend. At the
low level, we design new protocols that improve com-
putation speed. PrivPy shows great potential: it han-
dles large data set (1M-by-5K) and complex algorithms
(CNN) fast, with minimal program porting effort.
PrivPy opens up many future directions. Firstly, we
are improving the PrivPy computation engine to provide
active security while preserving high efficiency. Sec-
ondly, we would like to port existing machine learn-
ing libraries to our front-end. Thirdly, we will support
more computation engines. Fourthly, although we focus
on MPC in this work, we will introduce randomization
to protect the final results [39, 29]. Last but not least,
we will also improve fault tolerance mechanism to the
servers.
φ the big prime that determins the field
Zφ the additive group of integers module φ
b the bound of numbers in the computation
k the scaling factor
S(·) the secret sharing function splitting integersin Zφ to shares
x˜
the corresponding integer in Zφ of
a real number x
[[x]]
the secret sharing result of a real number x
that is equivalent to S(x˜)
[[·, ·]]−1 the reverse process of [[·]] that mapsthe secrets back to real numbers
I(·) the helper function that converts integers inZφ to the signed representation
x,y private variables
x1,x2
y1,y2
the shares of private variables
Table 8: The notations in this paper.
.1 Proof of security of the multiplication
PO
To argue the security of the multiplication PO protocol,
we define functionality Fmult in the ideal model, and
prove that it is indistinguishable from the real protocol
by constructing efficient simulators.
FunctionalityFmult
After receiving x1,y1 from S1 and x2,y2 from S2, it does
the following:
1. Sample z1 ∈ Zφ and set z2 = (x1+ x2)(y1+ y2)− z1.
2. Send z1 to S1 and z2 to S2.
The view of the i-th party (i ∈ {1,2}) during an
execution of a protocol pi on (x1,y1,x2,y2) is denoted
by Viewpii (x1,y1,x2,y2) and the output is denoted by
Out putpii (x1,y1,x2,y2), where the superscript pi is often
omitted.
Definition 1. Let pi be a protocol. We say that pi se-
curely realizesFmult in the presence of semi-honest ad-
versaries if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time al-
gorithms Sim1 and Sim2 such that the real view and the
corresponding simulated view are computationally indis-
tinguishable
Viewpii (x1,y1,x2,y2)≈ Simi(xi,yi,zi)
and Out putpii (x1,y1,x2,y2) = zi, for i ∈ {1,2}
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 securely realizes Fmult in pres-
ence of semi-honest adversaries.
Proof We just need to construct efficient simulators for
severs S1 and S2, which are referred to as Sim1 and Sim2
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respectively. Sim1 works as follows: After receiving rx
and ry from S1, Sim1 samples a random z∗a1 ∈ Zφ and
computes z∗b1 = z1− z∗a1− (x1− rx)(y1− ry) then sends
z∗a1 and z
∗
b1 to S1. View1(x1,y1,x2,y2) = (za1,zb1) is ran-
domly chosen by Sa and Sb, and thus View1 and Sim1
are indistinguishable. Sim2 works as follows: First, Sim2
samples r∗x ,r∗y and then sends them to S2. Next, it sam-
ples a random z∗a2 ∈ Zφ and computes z∗b2 = z2− z∗a2−
(x2+ r∗x)(y2+ r∗y), and then sends z∗a2 and z
∗
b2 to S2.
View2(x1,y1,x2,y2) = (rx,ry,za2,zb2), rx,ry are uni-
formly random and za2 ,zb2 are randomly chosen by Sa
and Sb, so View2 and Sim2 are indistinguishable. Fur-
ther, the severs Sa and Sb need no simulator to prove their
security. Because they have no output and the revealed
information(x′1,y
′
1 and x
′
2,y
′
2) are encrypted by one-time
pad (i.e., x′1 = x1− rx).
To conclude, Protocol 1 (multiplication) is securely re-
alized in presence of semi-honest adversaries. The ad-
dition are carried out using servers’ local data (without
communication), whose security proof is trivial. Next,
to argue the security of the whole protocol, we define
security in the ideal model, and show that it is indistin-
guishable from the real protocol by constructing efficient
simulators.
The ideal model (IDEAL)
f : ({0,1}∗)n→{0,1}∗ is an n-party function.
1. Input step: If ci (the ith participant) is honest then
he should send a legal input xi to IDEAL. Otherwise,
he sends either a legal input xi or ⊥ to IDEAL of its
choice.
2. Computation step: Upon receiving inputs from
all participants, IDEAL performs the computation. If
all the inputs are legal, it sets z = f (x1,x2, ......,xn).
Otherwise, it sets z=⊥.
3. Output step: IDEAL sends z to each participant.
Malicious participants are doing everything to the best
of their capacities to compromise the security. In this
ideal model where all participants have only oracle ac-
cess to the ideal functionality, malicious behaviors are
restricted to sending arbitrary inputs (either legal or the
illegal ‘⊥’). We remark that the above definition about
IDEAL is a simplified version tailored to our protocol. A
full-fledged definition further enables malicious adver-
saries (in the post-computation phase) to decide whether
the semi-honest parties should receive z or not (i.e., they
receive ⊥ instead), which is not possible in respect of
our protocol. Similar to the definition of semi-honest ad-
versaries, the view of the ith participant during an exe-
cution of pi under the malicious adversary A is denoted
by ViewpiA,i and the output is denoted by Out put
pi
A,i. We
further allow adversaries to collude and let ViewpiA,I be
the combined view of all malicious participants, i.e.,
⋃
i∈IViewpiA,i. This simplifies things as we need only a
single simulator SimI for all malicious participants com-
bined as one (instead of one for each malicious par-
ticipant) to produce some distribution indistinguishable
from ViewpiA,I . Further, it is natural to require the number
of malicious participants t ≤ n−1 simply because no se-
curity is possible when all participants are malicious and
colluding.
Definition 2. Let f : ({0,1}∗)n → {0,1}∗ be an N-
party function and pi be a protocol. We say that pi se-
curely computes f in presence of t malicious collud-
ing participants[40] in the client-server model if for
every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary A with a malicious participant set I ⊂ [n] with |I| ≤ t
, there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
SimI with oracle access to IDEAL such that for every in-
put vector~x= (x1,x2, ......,xn) ∈ ({0,1}∗)n we have
ViewpiA,I(~x)≈ SimI(~x)
and Out putpiA,i(~x) = f (~x) or ⊥, for i ∈ [n]− I
If all the participants send legal inputs, Out putpiA,i(~x)
must equal to f (~x). Otherwise, it must be ⊥.
Theorem 2. Our protocol securely realizes function f
in the client-server model in presence of (n− 1) mali-
cious colluding participants and semi-honest severs (i.e.,
S1,S2,Sa,Sb).
Proof The security for semi-honest servers simply fol-
lows from (the composition of) that of addition and mul-
tiplication (Theorem 1). It remains to show the secu-
rity for any n−1 malicious colluding participants. Each
ith participant holds his input xi and their its shares
(xi,1 and xi,2) to severs S1 and S2 respectively and waits
for the result. That is, for every input ~x ∈ ({0,1}∗)N ,
ViewpiA,i(~x) = {xi,1,xi,2,z}, and z is the output. The sim-
ulator does the following for each malicious ith partici-
pant: after receiving xi,1 and xi,2 from the ith participant
ci, it computes xi= xi,1+xi,2 and then sends xi to IDEAL.
After receiving the output z from IDEAL, it sends z to
ci. From the definition of IDEAL, we can ensure that
Out putpiA,i(~x) = f (~x) or ⊥ for i ∈ [n]− I. It is easy to see
that SimI perfectly simulates the combined view of all
malicious colluding participants for any subset I of size
up to n−1. This completes the proof.
.2 Numpy features implemented in PrivPy
In PrivPy front-end, we provide two Numpy features
widely utilized to implement machine learning algo-
rithms: broadcasting and ndarray methods.
Broadcasting allows operations between arrays of dif-
ferent shapes, by “broadcasting” the smaller one auto-
matically, as long as their dimensionalities match (see
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[21] for details). For example, given a scalar x, a 4× 3
array A, a 2×4×3 array B and a 2×1×3 arrayC, the ex-
pressions x
⊙
A, A
⊙
B and B
⊙
C are all legal in PrivPy,
where
⊙
can be +,×and > etc. Note that in PrivPy, the
above variables can be either public or private.
We also implement most of the ndarray methods of
Numpy, with which application programmers can ma-
nipulate arrays conveniently and efficiently, except for
the methods related with IO (we leave IO as the future
work). Table 9 lists the ndarray methods we have imple-
mented. Please see [22] for details of numpy.ndarray.
all any append argmax
argmin argparition argsort clip
compress copy cumprod cumsum
diag dot fill flatten
item itemset max mean
min ones outer partition
prod ptp put ravel
repeat reshape resize searchsorted
sort squeeze std sum
swapaxes take tile trace
transpose var zeros
Table 9: The ndarray methods implemented in PrivPy.
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